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CATHE SEMIOTICS OF SECURITY: Infectious DiseaseResearch and the Biopolitics of Informational Bodiesin the United States
CARLO CADUFF
University of Zurich
“This excess of biopower appears when it becomes technologically and polit-
ically possible for man not only to manage life but to make it proliferate, to
create living matter, to build the monster, and, ultimately, to build viruses
that cannot be controlled and that are universally destructive. This formidable
extension of biopower . . .will put it beyond all human sovereignty.”
—Michel Foucault, “Society Must be Defended”
I first learned about the quandary inwhich she found herself at the international
conference on Options for the Control of Influenza meeting in Toronto in June
2007.Mobilized by the presumable threat of a global pandemic, a record attendance
of 1,600 delegates from more than 66 countries gathered to discuss measures for
influenza detection, containment, and prevention. I had already encountered Dr.
Taronna Maines, a microbiologist and influenza researcher, a few months earlier
when I visited her lab at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) in
Atlanta, Georgia. My visit to Atlanta had been occasioned by a research article that
Dr. Maines and her colleagues at the influenza branch of the disease control centers
had recently published in a prestigious journal, the Proceedings of the National Academy
of Sciences. In the article, the scientists reported preliminary results of a series of
experiments conducted with a set of genetically engineered flu viruses (Maines
et al. 2006). According to Dr. Maines, the main purpose of the research was to
evaluate the pandemic potential of the H5N1 avian influenza virus that was rapidly
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CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 27:2
sweeping across Asia, Europe, and Africa at the time.What biomedical experts and
public health professionals feared most was that the notoriously unpredictable virus
might exchange genes with an ordinary human virus, obtain the transmissibility of
regular seasonal flu, and become a highly contagious pathogenic agent causing a
global pandemic.
Within this historically distinctive context marked by an uncertain microbial
entity, a growing biopolitical pressure, and an acute sense that the future was at
stake, Dr. Maines and her colleagues designed an experimental system to explore
under controlled conditions what might actually happen if the avian virus would
suddenly mix its genes with a highly transmissible human virus. Addressing an
important question currently investigated in experimental research, Dr. Maines
and her colleagues wondered why some viruses pass more easily among humans.
The project garnered considerable public attention and was covered in newspaper
articles (Chong 2006; Grady 2006).
Deploying a sophisticated technology of reverse genetics originally developed
by a group of microbiologists headed by Dr. Peter Palese at Mount Sinai School of
Medicine in New York, where I conducted a significant part of my fieldwork on
pandemic influenza, Dr. Maines carefully constructed a number of hybrid strains in
the laboratory.These genetically engineered strains containedgenes fromboth avian
and human influenza viruses. Not surprisingly, most of the genetic combinations
produced microbial creatures that were not viable at all, and the main technical
challenge was to find genes “that are happy together,” as Dr. Maines phrased it in
a conversation with me. The pandemic potential of those genetically engineered
viruses that replicated efficiently and grew well under laboratory conditions was
then investigated in an animal model.
In early 2006, Dr. Maines received a fresh stock of male ferrets, six to 12
months of age, raised at a commercial farm in the hills of northern Pennsylvania
and delivered by truck to the disease control centers. In the laboratory, 12 animals
were infected with a low dilution of the genetically engineered avian-human flu
strains. Ferrets are considered the most reliable animal model for the experimental
investigation of the transmission of influenza viruses, andDr.Maines observed them
closely over the next few days, although no transmission took place. None of the
hybrid strains, whose genes were “happy together,” appeared to be able to spread
easily from animal to animal despite genetic combination with influenza viruses
known for efficient transmission. In its current state, Dr. Maines and Dr. Terrence
Tumpey explained tome, the H5N1 avian influenza virus seemed to require further
adaptive steps to acquire the pandemic property for efficient transmission.
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THE SEMIOTICS OF SECURITY
With these experimental results on the table, Dr. Maines found herself entan-
gled in a difficult quandary, as she told me over lunch at theOptions for the Control
of Influenza meeting. As long as it would remain impossible for her to construct
hybrid strains that pass in the laboratory from ferret to ferret, it would not be
feasible for her to publish further research about the transmission of the H5N1
avian flu virus. Only positive experimental results would make possible another
publication in a journal. Publishing positive results that demonstrate the capacity
to adapt the avian virus in the laboratory by technical means and transform it into
a contagious agent, however, would be equally difficult, if not impossible. Even
though it might provide important scientific information regarding the pandemic
potential of the virus and possibly reveal some of the biological factors responsible
for the transmission of the flu, such an article, Dr. Maines explained to me, would
inevitably provoke serious security concerns among government officials, and per-
haps rightly so. At stake forDr.Maines, however,was not just the fate of a particular
research project, but the very possibility of participating in the moral economy
of scientific exchange (Daston 1995; Kohler 1994). No matter what her experi-
mental endeavors would eventually produce, be it positive or negative results, Dr.
Maines increasingly felt that her research was inextricably trapped in an expanding
script of security. Growing concerns with security, as I gradually came to realize
in the course of my fieldwork, loomed large on the horizon of infectious disease
researchers in the United States. Paradoxically, these concerns were both enabling
and disabling, as Dr.Maines’s project vividly demonstrated, opening up and closing
down promising avenues in the competitive world of cutting-edge science.
In this article I investigate a set of intensive security debates about infectious
disease research. As Ronald Atlas and Judith Reppy remarked in a sweeping 2005
publication, “in the current paradigm, all infectious disease research is potentially
relevant to bioterrorism andmay be implicated in controversies over themotivation
and possible uses of the research” (Atlas and Reppy 2005:52). According to Gerald
L. Epstein, infectious disease research has become “contentious research” because
it may generate information “that could have immediate weapons implications”
(Epstein 2002:398). Concerns with security are not new, to be sure. In fact,
infectious disease research has always been politically charged in many respects,
but it is now even more so, and in a very particular way. My aim here is to explore
how concerns over security have sparked a contentious debate about biological
research and its mandates, responsibilities, and accountabilities over the past few
years. What might an anthropological analysis of science and security be able to
tell us about the ways in which “life” is made a new political concern today?
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CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 27:2
Drawing onMichel Foucault’s lectures at theColle`ge de France, I first examine
the apparatus of security and its constitutive problematic of circulation. I specifically
suggest that, within the context of infectious disease research, security experts
have not been primarily concerned with the circulation of biological matter, as
Erin Koch, Andrew Lakoff, Celia Lowe, Kathleen Vogel and others have argued
in their examinations of today’s biosecurity formations (Koch 2008; Lakoff 2008;
Lakoff and Collier 2008; Lowe 2010; Vogel 2008).1 These experts, I suggest,
have also begun to focus on the exchange of scientific information. It is true, of
course, that experts have continued to be concerned with the dissemination of
biological matter and technological equipment—potentially dangerous scientific
information is worthless, after all, without simultaneous access to the complex and
sophisticated material infrastructure necessary to manipulate pathogenic agents in
the laboratory. But the concern with scientific information that has been expressed
over the past few years in relation to contemporary infectious disease research has
nonetheless affected the biopolitical economy of security in distinctive ways.
The focus on scientific information as a “security threat” is new in the context
of infectious disease research, to be sure; it is not new, of course, in the context of
the nuclear program, where the focus of state security experts has always been on
both dangerous matter and sensitive information (Galison 2004; Gusterson 1996;
Masco 2006). What is specific about the biological sciences, however, is that—in
contrast to the physical sciences—it ismatter itself that is increasingly understood in
informational terms (Fox Keller 2000; Kay 2000; Rheinberger 2000; Sunder Rajan
2006; Thacker 2006). Biological matter, in other words, is generally considered
informed matter today. My aim, consequently, is to attend to the historically
distinctive effects of this informational redefinition of biological materiality for the
biopolitical economy of security.
INFORMATION COMES TOMATTER
“Deadliest FluBugGivenNewLife inU.S. Laboratory,” a San Francisco Chronicle
article announced in early October 2005. The article reported that U.S. scientists
had re-created in the laboratory “a living copy of the deadly flu bug responsible for
the catastrophic 1918 Spanish influenza epidemic” (Russell 2005). The “Spanish flu”
was the most deadly influenza pandemic in history, killing an estimated 50 million
people worldwide. The novel strain of that particular virus was never isolated
in the laboratory. It quickly disappeared from the human population and was
replaced by other, less virulent strains of the virus. Then, almost a century later,
a team of U.S. researchers successfully reconstructed the virus in the test tube,
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THE SEMIOTICS OF SECURITY
rebuilding the pathogenic agent from its recovered genetic sequence. According to
the researchers, the scientific reason for the resurrection of the viruswas to examine
the biological mechanisms that may have contributed to the virus’s extraordinary
morbidity and mortality. Such research, the scientists suggested, might eventually
lead to effective forms of public health protection against future pandemics.
As Dr. Palese, the Chair of the Department of Microbiology at Mount Sinai
recalled in a conversation with me, the research conducted with his colleagues,
Dr. Jeffery Taubenberger of the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology in Rockville,
Maryland, and Dr. Terrence Tumpey of the CDC, originally began in 1995.
Small samples of infected human tissues soaked in formalin and sealed in paraffin
at the Armed Forces Institute, in addition to a few specimens recovered by a
certain Johann Hultin from a frozen corpse of an Inuit woman in Brevig Mission,
Alaska, allowed Taubenberger to sequence bits and pieces of the virus’s genetic
information. By means of a sophisticated technology known as reverse genetics,
adapted for influenza research by Dr. Palese in the late 1980s, and frequently
used in his laboratory, a replication of the actual virus was reconstructed in the
test tube. First, plasmids were constructed at Mount Sinai on the basis of the
sequence information provided by Taubenberger. In cell cultures, the genetically
engineered plasmids generated proteins, which then assembled into functional
particles. Following stringent biosafety procedures, the genetic information was
turned into viral matter in Dr. Tumpey’s laboratory at the disease control centers
in Atlanta. Dr. Tumpey finally injected the fully re-created virus into fertilized
chicken eggs, the standard growth medium in influenza research. He then infected
ferrets and mice with the agent. The results of the reconstruction were published
in Science on October 7, 2005 (Tumpey et al. 2005).2
As Dr. Palese told me, on September 27, 2005, the editorial board of Science
received an unexpected call from the Office of the Secretary of the U.S. Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services (HHS). In this call, serious security concerns
were signaled regarding the research article. A flurry of conference calls and elec-
tronic messages followed in which Assistant Secretary Stewart Simonson eventually
declared that the secretary of the department insisted on additional review of the
article by the recently established National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity
(NSABB)—a permanent federal body of 25 voting members who are considered
experts in the fields of science, medicine, and security and whose prime function
is to recommend policies. As the issue of Science was being printed, Simonson
announced that he had ordered the advisory board to be polled. The advisory
board “gave the paper an unusual last-minute review to make sure the merits of
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CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 27:2
its publication outweighed the risks of releasing potentially dangerous knowledge”
(Kaiser 2005:28). The board voted unanimously in favor of publication, requiring
the journal to add a special note explaining the general purpose of the research.
A series of newspaper articles about the resurrection of the virus had already
appeared before the scientific experiments had been completed, establishing a space
of “scandalous publicity,” to use Lawrence Cohen’s apt phrase; a space, in other
words, in which a public is formed “in the enunciation of scandal” and in which
there is growing political pressure to take a stance and either defend or denounce
the matter at stake (Cohen 1999:147, 2011 :33). In an April 2005 Washington Post
article, Wendy Orent suggests that “the feverish anxiety of public health officials
to head off a new influenza pandemic may be generating the greatest influenza
threat we face.” As Orent reasoned, once the genetic information is in the public
domain, “the entire 1918 flu could be built from scratch by anyone, anywhere,
who has sufficient resources and skill.” And she added, “it is quite conceivable that
resurrected 1918 flu could someday be used as a bioterrorist [sic] agent.” Charles
Krauthammer, a syndicatedWashington Post columnist, refers to the reconstruction
of the 1918 virus as a “scientific achievement of staggering proportions” (2005:A19).
Yet beyond the semblance of scientific brilliance, cautioned Krauthammer, “lies
the sheer terror.” He accused the researchers responsible for “the most momentous
event of our lifetime” to have opened the “gates of hell” by publishing the entire
sequence of the virus “for the whole world, good people and very bad, to see”
(Krauthammer 2005:A19).
At the center of the public scandal produced in the news media around the
resurrection of the microbial creature was the circulation of scientific information.
The circulation of such information in the public domain was generally considered
a significant condition of possibility, enabling its potential misappropriation by
malicious actors. In the next section I explore the problematic of circulation as a
constitutive concern of the apparatus of security.
SECURITY AND THE PROBLEMATIC OF CIRCULATION
Foucault’s approach has the general advantage of avoiding the reduction of se-
curity to a set ofmechanisms for the prevention of war. In Foucault’s work, security
comes into view primarily in relation to a historically distinctive problematic. As
he argued in Security, Territory, Population, the constitutive concern of security turns
on the optimal circulation of people, goods, and things (Foucault 2006; see as well
Thacker 2009). In contrast to both the apparatus of sovereignty and the apparatus
of discipline, security operates within a context containing heterogeneous givens
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THE SEMIOTICS OF SECURITY
that must be modified in accordance with their intrinsic qualities and tendencies.
For Foucault, a security apparatus does not seek to transform all the material givens
it encounters in the world; it rather operates with a rationality of the maximization
of positive elements and the minimization of negative elements. The problem,
Foucault pointed out, is no longer that of “fixing and demarcating the territory,
but of allowing circulations to take place, of controlling them, sifting the good and
the bad, ensuring that things are always in movement, constantly moving around,
continually going from one point to another, but in such a way that the inherent
dangers of this circulation are cancelled out” (Foucault 2006:91). For the apparatus
of security, the circulation of people, goods, and things thus constitutes the target
of intermittent intervention, not total reformulation. It is only when certain forms
of circulation begin to destabilize other forms that they must be controlled and
curtailed. The crucial question, as Foucault puts it, is thus the following: “How
should things circulate or not circulate?” (Foucault 2006:64).
Given its constitutive concern with the regulation and modulation of circula-
tion, it is hardly surprising to find the problem of infectious disease taken up by
the security apparatus. In a world that has increasingly learned to describe itself
in the symbolic form of “globalization” (Tsing 2000) and in which the metaphor
of “flow” has become “global common sense” (Zaloom 2006:3), concerns with the
threat of the spread of diseases have appeared at the center of a reconfigured order
of “post–ColdWar terrors” (Comaroff 2007:198). Among the key issues for public
health professionals who have begun to address the problem of emerging infectious
diseases in a global context is how to facilitate the flow of people, goods, and things
without abolishing the possibility of circulation in attempts to secure such flows.
Thus, endemic to the apparatus of security is a fundamental tension between the
necessity to promote and facilitate circulation, on the one hand, and the imperative
to regulate and modulate circulation, on the other hand. My aim here, however, is
not so much to analyze the contradictory principles at the heart of security in the
context of late liberalism but to track how the apparatus of security is reinvented
and reconstructed in relation to a reconfigured order of public health threats.
Today, the focus of the apparatus of security is not only on infectious diseases
but also on efforts to promote scientific research for the control and prevention
of infectious diseases. Scientific research itself, in other words, is now considered
a potential threat. The successful reconstruction of the 1918 virus is one of many
examples.3 At issue was always the potential release of a pathogenic agent, to
be sure, but the crucial problem was often located elsewhere. What drew the
most attention was not so much the potential circulation of dangerous biological
339
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CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 27:2
matter but, rather, the exchange of sensitive scientific information.What has come
into being as a result of this concern with the flow of information is “a map of
misreading.”
THE MAP OF MISREADING
In the aftermath of September 11, 2001, and the subsequent anthrax scare
in the United States, biologists faced growing concerns that scientific information
generated in the name of public health and its protection may be exploited by ter-
rorists for malicious purposes (Check 2002; Petro and Relman 2003). Facing rising
public fears and growing political efforts to promote a new category of information
termed “sensitive but unclassified” (see Knezo 2004; Masco 2010; Shea 2003), a
meeting of scientific publishers and editors was convened in January 2003 to discuss
the potential security implications of biological research. Increasingly embroiled
in politically charged struggles over the legitimacy and accountability of biological
research, leading journals responded to the political pressure in late February.
Both Science and Nature released editorial statements on scientific publication and
security, recognizing that “the prospect of bioterrorism has raised legitimate con-
cerns about the potential abuse of published information.”4 In their statements, the
editors vehemently rejected a formal role of the federal government, instead advis-
ing journals to take seriously their responsibility in determining what constitutes
sensitive information by designing appropriate procedures for the identification
of potential risks. In October of that year, the National Research Council of the
National Academies published Biotechnology in an Age of Terrorism—also known as
the Fink report—about technological advances that might be abused for nefarious
purposes (NRC 2003). The report suggested a series of modifications to resolve
the so-called dual-use dilemma, among them a systematic review of biological
experiments and scientific publications for potential security implications (Atlas
and Dando 2006).
At the center of this emerging apparatus of security is a particular concern,
namely, the concern over the possiblemisappropriation of scientific information. In
this context, the security apparatus has begun to address the problem of catachresis,
and in so doing it has simultaneously promoted a distinctive linguistic model.
Whatever the intended audience of a sign, insofar as it operates as a sign in the
natural economy of language, it can always come under the influence of unforeseen
readers. There is, in other words, forever the possibility of other contexts and
other circumstances in which other meanings may prevail. Foregrounding the
fundamental capacity of the sign to breakwith the context of its original enunciation,
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THE SEMIOTICS OF SECURITY
this linguistic model, increasingly operating at the heart of security, seems to reject
the logocentric premises of a theory of language, in which the consciousness of the
speaking subject is made the prime source of meaning. Significantly, this model also
recognizes the possibility of failure, that is to say, the inescapable risk of infelicity,
uncertainty, and ambiguity to which every enunciatory act always remains liable.
It is important to underline here that the determination of meaning nevertheless
continues to be context bound in this model. As Jonathan Culler astutely observed,
“meaning is context-bound, but context is boundless” (Culler 1981:24). What
will remain impossible is to limit context, so as to determine the true meaning of
a sign.
The recognition of the natural force intrinsic to the sign to break with context
and escape the author’s control has a long and complex history in modern under-
standings of language. It has also become an important concern in anthropological
debates.5 Yet my aim here is not so much to rely on a theory of the sign for the
analysis of the empirical material. Rather, I propose to trace a theory of the sign,
which is already embedded in the empirical material itself. What I suggest, in other
words, is to approach thematter of security “sideways.” Themethodological advan-
tage of approaching security sideways is to avoid taking for granted “the difference
between things and forms of explanation or abstraction” as Stefan Helmreich noted
in his work on marine microbiology (Helmreich 2009:23). I thus treat theories
(incl. theories of the sign) both as “tools for explaining worlds and as phenomena
in the world to be examined” (Helmreich 2009:23; see as well Strathern 1988).
Because of the particular theory of the sign embedded in the stuff of security, my
object of analysis becomes the very effort to search semiotic materials for a certain
type of meaning, which might be realized in the future.
In the context of infectious disease research, the sign increasingly comes
into view as an object acquiring its meaning not from its present but from its
future referent. What comes into existence as a result of this effort that builds
on the intrinsic ability of the sign to break from its context and graft itself onto
other structures of signification and acquire a new meaning is what we might
call, with literary critic Harold Bloom firmly in mind, “a map of misreading”
(Bloom 2003). Today, terrorists are primarily imagined as malicious agents who
deliberately exploit the public traffic of the sign, misappropriating the informa-
tional products of scientific labor circulating in a global system of generalized
exchange. The challenges of security are therefore to anticipate such misprision
and to mitigate the vulnerability of the scientific speech act. At the heart of the
emerging apparatus of security is the semiotic logic of iterability, the ability of
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CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 27:2
the sign to break from its context and acquire a new meaning. The sign, in this
account, appears to be driven by a natural “force of rupture” and is never abso-
lutely anchored in a given context; it can, on the contrary, always be spliced into
other chains of signification and assume an unexpected set of meanings (Derrida
1988).6
Next, I continue my exploration of the biopolitical economy of security. My
focus is on the emergence of a “nomadic geography” of the scientific sign in the
context of infectious disease research.7 In doing so, I hope to expand recent work
about the ways in which historically distinctive political practices are anchored in
biological truth discourses. In my discussion, I specifically foreground a significant
shift in the ontology of biological bodies that is at the heart of contemporary efforts
to regulate the circulation of information in the biological sciences.
SECURITY AND THEMICROBIAL BODY IN-FORMATION
The characteristic features of our contemporary immunopolitics in an “age of
security” have recently been examined in a set of sweeping articles published by a
group of critical thinkers (Braun 2007; Cooper 2006; Dillon 2003). What Bruce
Braun, Melinda Cooper, and Michael Dillon roughly share is a common diagnosis
that lies at the core of their theoretical interventions. At stake is, most broadly
stated, the politics of life in the philosophical tradition of Foucault. In his lectures,
Foucault developed his productive notion of security, at least to some extent, in
relation to the epidemiological thought and practice of the late 18th and early 19th
centuries.8 The ascendancy of microbiology in the 20th century marks a significant
break in the scientific understanding of infectious diseases and their presumable
causes. The emergence of a reconfigured epistemological and ontological order in
the 20th century, promoted by microbiology and its distinctive approach to living
matter, suggests that a reconsideration of Foucault’s original account of security is
overdue. Political struggles in which infectious diseases figure as central objects of
contestation have increasingly taken another shape because scientific understandings
of epidemic events have changed in significant ways.
For Braun, Cooper, and Dillon, the molecular revolution has fundamentally
changed our understanding of the biological itself. Not only has biological life been
molecularized, as Nikolas Rose (2001) notably proposes, but also has become con-
tingent, unpredictable, and emergent. “Molecularized life is . . . contingent life,”
Dillon argues (Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero 2009:16; see also Dillon 2007; Dillon
and Reid 2009). In the molecular age, “life” appears as relentlessly emerging and
intrinsically expansive; “its field of stability is neither rigorously determined nor
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THE SEMIOTICS OF SECURITY
constant” (Cooper 2008:35). Far from generating a stable form of existence, bio-
logical bodies now appear as if they were “thrown into a chaotic and unpredictable
molecular world filled with emergent yet unspecifiable risks” (Braun 2007:7). For
Braun, Cooper, and Dillon, the “precarious body” constitutes a new challenge for
the apparatus of security, posing the crucial question about how this body should
or should not circulate. The growing concern with security represents a political
response to the indeterminate, contingent, and aleatory character distinctive of the
“molecular vision” of the biological body (Kay 1996).
The work of Braun, Cooper, and Dillon opens up a promising line of inquiry
and scrutiny, enabling scholars to explore contemporary reconfigurations of the
apparatus of security beyond Foucault’s original account. Such reconfigurations are
occurring today, not least because biological bodies have been transformedby an “art
of continuous modulation, in which form is plunged back into process, becoming
continuously remorphable” (Cooper 2008:123). As Donna Haraway underscored
in her seminal essay on the biopolitics of postmodern bodies (Haraway 1991),
the destabilization of the hierarchical, localized, fixed organic body as a principal
anchor of biopolitical practice has resulted in a different kind of biopolitics, a
biopolitics of postmodern bodies. It is precisely such a postmodern body that is
at the heart of the emerging economy of security today, a body that is just as
much semiotic as it is corporeal. As a result of the ascendancy of molecular biology
and its “biotechnical touch,” to use Hannah Landecker’s felicitous phrase (2005),
biological bodies have increasingly begun to circulate in informational forms, rather
than corporeal ones. The fact, however, that the biological body is circulated and
exchanged in informational forms does not imply that this body is somehow not
material; the body in-formation has, on the contrary, its own distinctive materiality
(Hayles 1999; Stevens 2011; Thacker 2006).
We can now see that the changing ontological form of the biological body—
which increasingly finds itself entangled in a permanent process of formation and
reformation and is problematized in termsof a generalized economyof exchange and
circulation—has affected the biopolitical apparatus of security in the United States.
In the remainder of this article, I examine the ontological formof the biological body
and I show how its changing form has both stabilized and destabilized the security
apparatus. My aim is to bring into better relief the tensions, contradictions, and
contestations that have begun to manifest themselves in recent years and that are
not explored in the accounts of Braun, Cooper, and Dillon.What I have referred to
here as “iterability” permits a critical analysis of the fissures and fractures in today’s
biopolitical economy of security.
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CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 27:2
ITERABILITY AND THEMICROBIOLOGICAL ONTOLOGY OF THE
PATHOLOGICAL
Aware of the fundamental ability of information to be detached from its
original context, the security apparatus has become concerned with the public
circulation and potential misappropriation of sensitive information. Nevertheless,
in the conversations that I conducted and in the debates that I witnessed during
my fieldwork, such information was simultaneously recontextualized. This should
come as no surprise at all, to be sure, for “one cannot do anything, least of all speak,
without determining (in a manner that is not only theoretical, but practical and
performative) a context,” as Jacques Derrida observed (Derrida 1988:136). The
moment of detachment, in other words, is always also a moment of reattachment,
and the logic of iterability therefore constitutes the condition of possibility of both
detachment and reattachment.
In the course of my research, I increasingly realized that biologists of in-
formation frequently responded to security demands with a biology of context.9
What eventually came into view was not so much a situated science but a situating
science—not a contextualized biology but a contextualizing biology, a biology of
context.When I asked Dr. Palese about the publication of the controversial article,
he stated:
“We felt very strongly that the paper should be published. There was no
reason that it shouldn’t. At the time we already knew for example that the
1918 virus can be inhibited by anti-influenza virus drugs, which, I think, is
very important.”
In his conversations with me, Dr. Palese always insisted that the public perception
of the 1918 virus as a “microbial monster” was inadequate. His view of the virus
was based on a series of experiments conducted in advance of the article’s pub-
lication. These experiments were designed to assess whether vaccines for regular
seasonal flu would provide protection against recombinant viruses, which con-
tained the immunologically relevant genes derived from the 1918 virus. They were
conducted to contextualize the virus in contemporary circumstances, and they
confirmed Dr. Palese’s assumption that current vaccines would protect in part
because the 1918 virus belongs to the same subtype of the influenza virus (H1N1)
that is currently circulating in the human population. In addition to these experi-
ments, the scientists tested the efficacy of four antiviral drugs, which also proved
effective.10
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In his characteristically blunt and plain-speaking manner, Dr. Palese suggested that
there was no justification in his view to classify the 1918 virus as a “select agent”:
Very recently we have published a paper where we showed that you actually
can protect against the 1918 virus with the current vaccine for the H1N1
influenza virus. With an influenza virus that is fairly similar to the 1918 virus,
we already have a population which is almost completely protected against
the 1918 virus. The fact that the regular vaccine formulation protects against
the 1918 virus brings this virus into the realm of regular influenza viruses and
does not justify people making it a select agent and preventing researchers
from working on it. It’s completely unjustified. Drugs work, vaccines work,
I mean, what else do we have to have?11
Nevertheless, security reports released by state agencies frequently invoked the
resurrection of the 1918 virus as an illustrative example of the new dangers
produced by contemporary biological research. The fact that both regular antiviral
drugs and regular flu vaccines had been shown to work against the 1918 virus was
never taken into account systematically. Dr. Palese also emphasized that the entire
human populationwas now carrying a partial immunity to the 1918 virus, especially
after themost recent pandemic,whichwas caused by a similar strain of the virus. “So
by learning all this, by knowing all this, I think this is very important information,”
he underscored. Microbiologist Dr. Richard Ebright, who questioned Palese’s
research in 2005, concurred in an interviewwith me, explaining that his comments
about the resurrection of the 1918 virus “only apply to the situation as of October
2005, when the reconstruction of the 1918 virus was published.” These comments,
he continued, “may not fully apply to the situation after October 2009, due to
the immunological impacts of the H1N1 pandemic.” Despite these qualifications,
the virus was eventually classified as a “select agent” by the U.S. government. The
availability and effectiveness of immunizations and antiviral therapies to prevent
infection and treat illness were not taken into consideration. What appeared to be
more important, by contrast, was the public debate about the potential “threat,”
which created its own performative effect. The very fact of a growing debate about
a potential threat seemed to make the security response inevitable.
In the course of my work with Dr. Palese, I increasingly understood that
he should not just be seen as a biologist of information but also, and perhaps
primarily, as a biologist of context. In our conversations about pandemic influenza,
he was always careful to consider the pathogenic agent in its biological milieu,
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emphasizing its relationships with other entities. In so doing, he systematically
avoided the reification of the virus as an organic totality set apart from other
organic totalities. For Dr. Palese, its resemblance to other strains of the virus, its
susceptibility to antiviral drugs, and its responsiveness to current vaccines were
critical. It was impossible to talk about the 1918 virus without simultaneously
talking about its hosts. For the virus it thus seemed difficult to have an identity
prior to being brought into relation with other bodies, human and nonhuman.
What I learned from Dr. Palese is to understand the pathological as an encounter
and, therefore, as a relative value. Disease, I concluded, must be conceived of as
an ever-shifting, ever-changing relationship.
Iterability is the general condition that has made the decontextualization
of microbial bodies in-formation possible. But it has concomitantly made the
recontextualization of these bodies necessary, biologically as well as politically—
and that is to say biopolitically. The articulation, contestation, and negotiation
of the security demands that have been proposed over the past few years take
place now in terms of a biology of context or, as Landecker might phrase it, in
terms of a “relational biology” (2011:169): “Rather than pursuing the qualities
and quantities intrinsic to living things—their genetic sequences, their functional
structures—these relational approaches are more likely to focus on the biology of
the in between” (Landecker 2011:168). For Dr. Palese, it was this space in between
that was most productive, scientifically as well as politically.
In the final section of this article, I explore Landecker’s suggestion in more
detail and examine how experts concernedwith security have determined “sensitive
information” in the context of contemporary infectious disease research. How
exactly is “sensitive” informationdistinguished fromother, presumably less sensitive
information? How is the infinitely expandable category of “sensitive information”
actually defined?What principles for the containment of the category are mobilized
in this emerging economy of security?
TAXONOMIC TROUBLE
What may be the most informative research . . .must surely be the most
dangerous as well.
—Jamie Shreeve, New York Times
In early 2006, the federal government charged the NSABB to examine the potential
risks posed by the synthetic construction of biological agents in research labora-
tories.12 Specifically, the board was asked to assess whether pathogenic agents
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generated by means of reverse genetics (such as the 1918 virus) escape the purview
of the existing regulatory system established under the Public Health Security
and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002. As the NSABB noted
in a report, technologies such as reverse genetics and the open availability of
genetic information on public data banks “have raised concerns in the scientific
community and general public regarding the possible use of this technology and
information to generate biological agents that could threaten public health” (NS-
ABB 2006:2). The board further reported, “approaches based on de novo synthesis
avoid any need for access to the naturally occurring agents or naturally occur-
ring nucleic acids from these agents” (NSABB 2006:2). Significantly, the kind of
genetic information allowing researchers to synthesize these pathogenic agents in
the laboratory by means of reverse genetics is available online. Given the new
technological capabilities, experts concerned with security have argued that it is
necessary to establish a new regime of governance reaching beyond the current
regulation of dangerous matter (Bu¨gl et al. 2007). What must be controlled and
curtailed is not only the circulation of dangerous biological matter but also the
exchange of sensitive scientific information because of the general availability of the
technology.
The simplest and cheapest way for a scientist to design and construct (or
redesign and reconstruct) a microbial body in-formation is to order a gene or a
full genome online from a commercial firm. As of 2012, approximately 45 private
companies provide researchers with this essential service. Typically, researchers
place orders for several small pieces of DNA that they then assemble on their
own. In the laboratory, experimental work with microbial bodies in-formation
often drew the scientists with whom I worked into lively discussions about the
quantity of plasmids, the quality of reagents, the purity of cells, the temperature of
agar, and the fate of bad hands. The technical procedures required to sustain this
peculiar type of biological materiality were inevitably fraught with considerable
contingency and created a certain anxiety, especially among graduate students in
the laboratory. The techniques to culture bodies in-formation remain remarkably
precarious and seem to require what Evelyn Fox Keller once identified as a “feeling
for the organism” and what I might call a sensibility for its milieu (Fox Keller 2001).
Although a routine procedure in research laboratories, both private and public, the
construction of a virus in the test tube is neither simple nor straightforward. It is,
on the contrary, a complex technical craft, fraught with failures. It is based on a
highly skilled labor and requires patience, experience, and luck. Simply following
the standard protocol as others have developed is no guarantee for sure success.
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The effort to create the right milieu in the laboratory turns out to be essential for
the successful animation and circulation of microbial bodies in-formation.
In their efforts to determine what kind of information might present the
greatest concern, security experts initially suggested that scientific information
concerning the most dangerous agents concomitantly constitutes the most sensitive
information. Here, then, a certain classification of dangerous biological matter
served as a model for the classification of sensitive scientific information. Charged
to identify sensitive scientific information, experts thus invoked the presumably
stable ground of dangerous biological matter and its current taxonomical classifi-
cation. However, as the NSABB report concurrently noted, genomic research has
increasingly begun to challenge such classifications. As the report argued,
Studies of human pathogens using genomics-based approaches have revealed an
enormous level of strain diversity that has challenged our notion of microbial
species as discrete entities with well-defined properties. This diversity in
large part reflects the fact that microbial genomes are dynamic entities shaped
by multiple forces, including acquisition of new functions via lateral gene
transfer. One implication of these observations is that in some instances the
assignment of a genus/species name to an organism may be difficult, and
of limited utility, in predicting the phenotypic properties of a particular
isolate, in particular with regard to virulence, infectivity and pathogenicity.
Therefore, the genus/species based approach that is currently used in Select
Agent classification is imperfect since it does not take into account the great
degree of genetic variability that can exist within species as they are currently
defined. [NSABB 2006:13]
The fact that scientists are constructing and reconstructing microbes in the labora-
tory on a regular basis using combinations of geneticmaterials derived fromdifferent
species has gradually begun to reveal the limits of a biopolitical economy of secu-
rity, which is based on tidy taxonomic definitions, permanent organic substances,
and stable genetic essences. New microbial creatures, which blur the boundaries
of species—and thus challenge the very concept of the “species”—are potentially
equipped with equivalent properties as select agents, but they may not necessarily
fit into the taxonomic tables of the classical Darwinian sort. Such organisms thus
increasingly seem to become illegible in a regime in which legibility primarily
depends on affixing a genus or species name on a microorganism. Here, then, the
experimental practice of reverse genetics—or the ability of researchers to take
advantage of the logic of iterability and replicate, recombine, and rearrange bodies
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in-formation by technical means—appears to have destabilized a regime, which
derives its standards of evaluation from a taxonomic system of classification. Taking
into account that microbial genomes are now considered dynamic, ever-shifting en-
tities, shaped by multiple forces, both natural and technical, tidy taxonomic tables
increasingly prove less than adequate to reliably predict pathogenic effects. Reverse
genetics is a powerful cut-and-paste technology taking advantage of the logic of
iterability. Relentlessly replicating, recombining, and rearranging geneticmaterials
in the test tube, and thereby constructing and reconstructing microorganisms in
the artificial environment of the laboratory, researchers have successfully tied rep-
etition to alterity and turned iterability into a generative principle of experimental
practice. Genetic sequences are decontextualized and recontextualized on a regular
basis, and new microbial bodies in-formation with “uncertain ontologies” are pro-
duced along the way (Lowe 2010). These new creatures call for a relational biology
and increasingly disrupt conventional efforts to provide biological bodies with a
proper name and a proper place in an evolutionary genealogy of microbial descent.
It would be a mistake, however, to suggest that iterability can be observed
only inside the laboratory. The logic of iterability is at the heart of both a technical
procedure and a natural mechanism. As scientific studies have shown, microorgan-
isms receive genetic materials not only from their ancestors but also from other
organisms without necessarily being their offspring (Gogarten et al. 2009). Genes,
in other words, are also transferred horizontally between organisms that are only
distantly related. Such horizontal gene transfer has been explored by Helmreich in
a 2003 article, where he argued that the lateral exchange of genetic material among
microorganisms observed in the extreme ecologies around hydrothermal vents
may contribute to the dissolution of the traditional relation between genealogy and
taxonomy. In the case of microorganisms, the discovery of horizontal gene transfer
is now encouraging scientists “to give up the notion of species for recombining
microbes,” as suggested in a recent account on the epistemological impacts of
horizontal gene transfer (Bapteste and Boucher 2009:71). Helmreich underscored
that the “taxonomic untidiness such microbes have introduced through their lateral
gene transfer reaches beyond issues in phylogeny and molecular systematics into
arenas adjacent to kinship concerns and biopolitics” (Helmreich 2003:341; see also
Helmreich 2009). “When genes become information and are made legible through
gene sequencing and bioinformatics,” Helmreich reasoned, “the biopolitics that
result may well be new” (Helmreich 2003:341).
If the microbiological ontology of the pathological offered modes of classifica-
tion and standards of evaluation allowing experts to establish normative principles
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for the biopolitical economy of security and to determine the kind of circulations
that must be controlled and curtailed, then the logic of iterability has profoundly
undermined this ontology. The fact that some pathogenic agents are inherently less
“dangerous” than others does not necessarily mean that the genetic sequences of
these agents are equally “harmless.” Because of the high sequence similarity of some
select agents with other organisms, the genetic sequence of a “harmless” organism
may ultimately prove just as “dangerous” as the genetic sequence of an organism
officially classified as a select agent. Seeking to define “sequences of concern,” a
series of guidelines were released in October 2010, which recognized that genetic
sequences not unique to select agents exist that may also pose a security concern
(HHS 2010).
Today, the biopolitical economy of security is not only preoccupied with a
distinctive practice (the public exchange of information) and with a distinctive
problem (information’s essential iterability) but also confronted with a new chal-
lenge caused by the disruption of a form of regulation and modulation, which
is based on the taxonomic identification of microbial organisms. Consequently,
we are witnessing new excesses of biopower that are the result not only of the
technological possibility of building viruses that cannot be controlled but also
the technological possibility of building viruses with information that cannot be
contained.
EPILOGUE
At the heart of the current attempt to regulate biological research is the cir-
culation of information. As Evelyn Fox Keller, Lily Kay, and others have shown,
information is a rather problematic and confusing concept, especially in the bi-
ological sciences (Fox Keller 2000; Kay 2000; see also Gere and Parry 2006).
Yet although information appears to be confusing as a concept, it has nevertheless
been incredibly productive, perhaps precisely because it is so confusing in the first
place (Rheinberger 2000). Confusing (and confusingly productive) as it may be,
information has operated as a generative “boundary concept,” establishing relations
between separate and separated domains (Star and Griesemer 1989). Today, the
boundary concept of information has become a driving force reconfiguring relations
among science, security, and the state. As a result, biologists of information such
as Dr. Palese, Dr. Maines, and Dr. Tumpey are now unexpectedly drawn into
expanding debates about the security implications of their work. A biology that has
increasingly become informational has attached them in unexpected ways to the
world, to the state, and to security. In conversations with me, these biologists of
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information have always insisted on the stringent safety precautions that must be
observed in the laboratory, but they have concomitantly stressed the importance
of publishing the results of experimental research without externally imposed lim-
itations or restrictions. It is their belief that such a strategy of safety and precaution
is both improving science and protecting the public’s health.
Underwriting this belief is the liberal imaginary of an unrestricted exchange
and free sharing of information. This imaginary is, of course, itself a constitutive
element of the founding myth of modern science. It would be a mistake, therefore,
to consider it an adequate description of the actual practice; it should rather be
seen, historian of science Robert Kohler suggested, as the articulation of a moral
code (Kohler 1994:134). With Kohler’s Lords of the Fly in mind, it is fair to say that
this moral code continues to shape the way scientists perceive themselves today.13
This perception also accounts for the fact that scientists have frequently declared
that security concerns and intellectual property rights are increasingly straining the
moral economy of scientific exchange in which they are supposed to participate.
At stake in these debates are thus questions about the moral foundations of the
scientific community. There is no doubt that the notion of information continues
to be essential for the relational understanding of the biological that biologists
of information are currently promoting. But the notion also constitutes a central
element of their moral identity as scientists engaged in social relationships mediated
by the public exchange of scientific information. As a boundary concept, the notion
of information thus structures both a scientific understanding of biology and its
moral foundation as a science based on social relationships mediated by a form of
exchange. Today’s biologists of information are engaged in the difficult effort of
constructing a biology of context, reflecting the crucial question of what it means
to be a scientist.
Scientific discourse is public discourse, and public discourse has committed
itself, in principle, to the potential participation of strangers. Abandoning the
safety and security of its given audience and pursuing an ethics of estrangement,
public discourse systematically “puts at risk the concrete world that constitutes
its condition of possibility” (Warner 2005:113). Today’s challenge, therefore, is
to cultivate a mode of practice beyond security as a liberal technology of power.
Such a mode of practice would allow biologists of information to sustain the
“fruitful perversity” of the scientific speech act without producing a world in
which knowledge becomes suspect (Masco 2010). It may very well be that the
meaning of both the biologists and the biology of informationmust be remade along
the way.
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ABSTRACT
In this article, I investigate the biopolitical economy of security as it is operating today
in the United States in the context of infectious disease research. Drawing on my work
with influenza researchers, I specifically show how experts have been concerned not
only with the circulation of biological matter but also with the exchange of scientific
information. I argue that it is a specific logic—the logic of iterability—that is at
the heart of the growing concern with “sensitive information” published in scientific
journals. How has the concern with sensitive information affected infectious disease
research in the United States in the past few years? How has the logic of iterability
reconfigured microbiological notions of the normal and the pathological? And what
might an anthropological analysis of the biopolitical economy of security be able to tell
us about the ways in which “life” is made a new political concern today?
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1. For additional examples, see Bingham and colleagues (2008); Collier and colleagues (2004);
King (2002); and Lentzos and Rose (2009).
2. Before the experiments were conducted, CDC’s Institutional Biosafety Committee reviewed
the proposed research extensively. All experimental procedures were carried out in a biosafety
level 3–enhanced facility, which includes controlled access, systematic decontamination as
well as primary safety barriers (safety cabinets, isolation chambers, gloves, and gowns) and
secondary safety barriers (special facility constructionwith restricted access and high-efficiency
particulate air filtration) to protect the scientists and the public from accidental exposure.
The enhanced procedures used for the reconstruction of the 1918 virus include additional
respiratory protection, clothing changes, and personal showers prior to exiting the laboratory.
All laboratory workers were also required to take antiviral prophylactics while conducting
the experiments. Here, I will not provide further detailed analysis of these precautions,
focusing instead on efforts to regulate and modulate the exchange of sensitive scientific
information.
3. For others, see the list provided in Fink (2003).
4. See Atlas and colleagues (2003).
5. To mention just one among many other accounts, see Urban 1996.
6. See as well Das (2004). My thanks to Lawrence Cohen for bringing Veena Das’s important
essay to my attention and for engaging my work on the matter of security more generally.
7. The term nomadic geography is Helmreich’s (2003:208).
8. Of equal importance for Foucault’s understanding of security was of course the physiocratic
thought of the 18th century.
9. I am indebted to Hannah Landecker, who suggested these terms to me.
10. This argument presupposes that such vaccines and antiviral drugs are readily available, which
might not necessarily be the case.
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11. Select agents are pathogenic organisms or toxins that have been declared by U.S. government
agencies to have a potential to pose a significant threat to public health.
12. The challenges presented by techniques of recombinant DNA were addressed in 1975 at the
historic Asilomar conference in Pacific Grove, California, where scientists from around the
world gathered to discuss the potential hazards of genetic engineering. These discussions es-
tablished the foundations of most contemporary safety practices in the biological sciences. The
focus at Asilomar was mainly on environmental safety issues and therefore differs considerably
from the problematization of the biological sciences in terms of security. On the Asilomar
conference, see Hindmarsh and Gottweis (2005) and Krimsky (2005).
13. Thanks to Peter Redfield for reminding me here of Kohler’s important work.
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